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The International Court of Justice
EBERHARD P. DEUTSCH*
That an international tribunal should have no cases to decide is largely
attributable to its own fault. Yet the International Court of justice
was, for some months in 1970, for the first time in its history, in that
unfortunate predicament. It is so again.
From the time of the decision in the Barcelona Traction case, the
Court had not a case before it, until the time of the case of the Namibia
mandate, and since the decision in that case, it is again without business.
Very recently India is reported to have instituted a complaint against
Pakistan.
During the interval, it is considering amendments to its rules, and is,
in effect, sitting on its hands, while presumably contemplating the stars.
What is wrong? What changes will enable the court to function? What
is holding back the nations of the world in bringing actions before
the court? Can the court succeed in its function to "take effective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace
... [through] adjustment[s] or settlement of international disputes ...
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law."'
It is submitted that it can, if the powers that control the destinies of
the United States and those of the Soviet Union want the Court to func-
tion as it was intended to function.
In the first place, the Court is a natural outgrowth of a series of efforts,
begun in 1899 at The Hague, when representatives of the nations of the
world met there to institute it. Then, in 1907 they met again in the
same place and started the Permanent Court of Arbitration which was
not a court at all, in the real sense of the word.
In 1920, the Committee of Jurists put their heads together, and
began working out their problems, in an effort to find a solution. They
came up with a plan, which overcame at least the first problem-up to that
*Of the New Orleans Bar.
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. .
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time insoluble-they found a way to elect judges and this created the fore-
runner of the present court.
The United States never joined the League of Nations, and accord-
ingly never joined the Permanent Court of International Justice; but
it managed to have a judge on the bench throughout its roughly twenty-
year history.
During that time, the Court managed to render some 62 decisions, 35
disputed and 27 advisory opinions-or say three decisions a year. This
was a pitifully small docket to control, but it encouraged the world.
It really portended little. With the Second World War came a re-
surgence of the demand for an international court that would prevent
conflict. The United States Senate refused to declare the nation's ad-
herence to the Court except under an emasculating reservation.2
Then there was the Communist bloc. It refused to declare adherence
to the Court's jurisdiction at all-while maintaining a two to four man
judge minority on the Court.
During the nearly thirty-year period of its functions, it had decided
some 40 cases, or an average of less than two a year. And, as stated,
during the latter part of its existence, it has handled only one advisory
opinion.
Surely there is something wrong-something missing in the structure
of the Court, that keeps it from functioning. There are only some forty
adherences to the Court's jurisdiction, and only two among these are
really unreserved.
Will repeal of the Connally Amendment to the United States Reserva-
tion save the Court? Most assuredly not, since that Amendment affects
nobody-not even the United States, really.
Is the trouble not something much more fundamental? Is it not really
a distrust of judges who are still nationals of their own countries, ap-
pointed for limited terms, and bound to determine questions of their
own jurisdiction as they see them-anxious to increase their own dockets?
The great powers simply will not submit their controversies to a court
in which they do not have confidence. No one will assert that they
would so submit to a court composed of judges who have agreed to give
up their nationalities for life, but it will be a step in the right direction.
Nor will anyone agree that an honest vote on jurisdiction is assured
by requiring the judges to decide questions of their own jurisdiction by
2. This reservation in pertinent part provides, "that this declaration shall not apply
to . . . disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of
America .. " [1969-1970] I.C.J.Y.B. 80 (emphasis added).
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a two-thirds vote. Or will they? Will not the two factors of giving up
their citizenship for life, and requiring a two-thirds vote improve con-
fidence in the tribunal?
In his annual report for 1955 to the General Assembly, Dag Ham-
merskjold, its then Secretary-General, submitted that "it is surely
in the interest of all Member States to restrict as much as possible the
sphere where sheer strength is an argument and to extend as widely as
possible the area ruled by considerations of law and justice. In an inter-
dependent world, a greater degree of authority and effectiveness in
international law will be a safeguard, not a threat, to the freedom and
independence of national States." 3
In the first place, then, the jurisdiction of the Court can be assured
to take place only over matters believed to be strictly within the inter-
national arena. This assurance can be given by a proposal that the
Court is not to overrule an objection to its own jurisdiction except by a
vote of ten of its judges (two-thirds of its entire membership).
This should give ample assurance, but the number can be increased
even to an unanimous vote, to give Russia assurance of a veto. And the
statute can provide that "any doubt as to whether a matter is essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state shall be resolved by the Court
in favor of such domestic jurisdiction."
The late, great Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, in a recent edition of
his book, edited by his son, on The Development of International Law by
the International Court, said: "If government by men, and not by
laws, is resented within the state by individuals, any appearance of it
is likely to be viewed with even greater suspicion on the part of sovereign
states in relation to judges of foreign nationality. The problem of
judicial impartiality, however exaggerated it may be on occasions, is an
ever-present problem in relation to international tribunals ... "4
As long ago as September 1927, a committee of judges of the Per-
manent Court of International Justice, in a report rendered with refer-
ence to the advisability of permitting appointment of judges ad hoc
by litigants in cases submitted for advisory opinions, themselves con-
ceded that "of all influences to which men are subject, none is more
powerful, more persuasive or more subtle, than the tie of allegiance
that binds" them "to the lands of their homes and kindred, and to the
great sources of the honours and preferments for which they are so
3. Secretary-General, Annual Report, 10 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 1, at xiii, U.N. Doc.
A/2911 (1955).
4. H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT 40 (1934).
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ready to spend their fortunes and to risk their lives."5
Judge Lauterpacht found, after an appropriate investigation, "that
in no case have national (ad hoc) judges voted against their state," a
circumstance which "cannot be regarded as a mere coincidence." 6 More
recent statistical data disclose that on twelve occasions from 1922 to 1960
a national (ad hoc) judge has formed a minority of one on the side of his
own country.7
In the fifth century B.C., Thucydides is reported to have made the
cynical suggestion that "it had always been a settled rule that the weaker
should be constrained by the stronger . . ." but "you now avail your-
selves of the appeal to justice; which no one ever brought forward when
he had a chance of gaining anything by might ... "8
In an Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe, William
Penn said, with reference to the suggestion "that sovereign princes and
states will," by the establishment of such a court, "become not sovereign,"
that "if this be called a lessening of their power, it must be only because
the great fish can no longer eat up the little ones."0
Of course, sovereign nations remain extremely jealous of their
sovereignties. They simply will not give up their right, as in the case of
the United States and the Soviet Union, to hold the feet of the smaller
nations to the fire; or as in the case of those smaller nations, to hold on
to their single votes as against the single votes of the United States
and the Soviet Union in the United Nations.
Very recently there was introduced in the United Nations, a request for
a review of the role of the International Court of Justice to remove
obstacles to its satisfactory functioning.1°
This suggestion was referred, in September 1970 by the General
Assembly to the Sixth (Legal) Committee, which worked assiduously on
the matter during October and November; and on 11 December 1970,
its report was placed before the General Assembly.
5. Publication, [1927) P.C.I.J., ser. E, No. 4, at 187.
6. H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 230-
232 (1933).
7. [T]he dissenting vote of the judge ad hoc chosen by the State which loses the
case, when it is a constant phenomenon, as has been the case thus far, constitutes
an insurmountable obstacle to unanimity ....
Response of Switzerland to the Secretary-General's Questionnaire on the International
Court of Justice, Report of the Secretary-General, Review of the Role of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, 26 U.N. GAOR, at 63, U.N. Doc. A/8382 (1971).
8. THUcyDmEs, 1 TnE PELOPENESSIAN WAR 47 (H. Dale transl. 1893).
9. W. PENN, An Essay Toward the Present and Future Peace of Europe (1693), in
THE PEACE OF EUROPE: AND OTHER WRITINGS BY WILLIAM PENN 15 (E. Rhys ed. 1963).
10. Request for a Review of the Role of the International Court of Justice, 25
U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/8042 (1970).
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The report recommended adoption of a watered-down resolution,
calling on member states and states parties to the ICJ "to submit to the
Secretary General, by 1 July 1971, views and suggestions concerning the
role of the Court on the basis of [a] questionnaire to be prepared by the
Secretary-General," inviting "the Court to state its views, should it so
desire," and requesting the Secretary-General "to prepare a comprehen-
sive report in the light of the opinions expressed by the States and the
Court. .. ."I
The recommendations of the Sixth Committee (which had been
adopted in that Committee by consensus) was in turn adopted unani-
mously by the General Assembly on 15 December 1970.12
Efforts to get agreement on a better resolution, providing for the ap-
pointment of an ad hoc committee to study and report on the over-all
question, were defeated through the intractable opposition of the Com-
munist bloc. In the Sixth Committee, the Soviet Representative (Mr.
Kolesnik) stated that "the USSR opposed any form of consideration of
the role of the Court ... "13
He went on to say that it was "the USSR's basic position that the
reason for the Court's present lack of activity was that it had handed
down unjust decisions and not that its Statute was defective. It was for
the Court to find a way out of its dilemma. [A]ny review of the Court's
role and any attempt to undermine its Statute and the United Nations
Charter were unacceptable; nor could it agree to States having the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction in violation of their sovereign rights."' 4
In the General Assembly, the same Soviet representative, explaining
that his "delegation did not wish to impede the unanimous adoption by
the General Assembly of the draft report of the Sixth Committee",
stated, in effect, that its failure to object to the resolution as adopted
was not to be construed as an agreement with the resolution, asserting
"that it is really not at all satisfied with the resolution which has been
adopted .. ."15
He submitted that his delegation does "not support the idea of a
consideration of the question of the so-called role of the International
Court in any form at all."'0 "The Soviet delegation would state that
11. Sixth Committee (Legal), Report, 25 U.N. GAOR, at 28, U.N. Doc. A/8238
(1970).
12. GA. Res. 2723, 26 U.N. GAOR.
13. Sixth Committee (Legal), Provisional Summary Record, 25 U.N. GAOR, at 6,
A/C.6/ SR.1229 (1970).
14. Id.
15. Provisional Verbatim Record of the Nineteen Hundred and Thirty-First Meeting,
U.N. GAOR, at 13, U.N. Doe. A/PV. 1931 (1970).
16. rd.
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the adoption of this resolution in no way detracts from its fundamental
position. The Court has fallen into a period of idleness, not because of
any flaw in the Statute of the Court, but because it has compromised
itself by erroneous decisions."11
On 15 and 30 September 1971, the Secretary-General issued his Report
in the form of a 130-page "Review of the Role of the International
Court of Justice" with a thirteen page addendum, consisting of excerpts
from the replies he had received to a questionnaire he had issued pur-
suant to Resolution 2723 (XXV) of the General Assembly.' 8
Most of the material is of little value. For instance, Cuba responded
that ". . . in the last instance, it is the Court which should adopt meas-
ures to enhance its effectiveness."' 9 The Soviet Union replied that "...
the Soviet Union feels that there is not sufficient reason at present to
believe that a review by the United Nations General Assembly of the
role of the International Court of Justice could lead to an improvement
in the functioning of the Court." 20
On the other hand, tiny Laos responded that the "Statute of the Court
should be revised on the principle of compulsory adherence whereby all
States Members of the United Nations would undertake in advance to
comply with the decisions of the Court and to enforce them in the
same way as decisions of their national courts."21
Remarkably, Poland has made much the same suggestion: "The
practice of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court with
reservations makes the acceptance only apparent. The experience indi-
cates that the efforts aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of this judicial
organ should be primarily directed at overcoming distrust and en-
couraging States to bring disputes before the Court, and this could be
done by making improvements within the present framework of the
Statute."22
Senegal, in its reply, has indicated that giving the Court compulsory
jurisdiction might tend to bring the organization to a premature end:
"All the efforts made so far to impose the jurisdiction of the Court auto-
matically have met with resistance from States which consider that their
sovereignty would be impaired. It is probable that, if the Charter and
the Statue were amended to that effect, a number of States would prefer
17. Id. at 14-15.
18. 26 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/8382 and Add. 1.
19. Report of the Secretary-General, Review of the Role of the Court of Inter-
national Justice, at 127, 26 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/8382 (1971). See Czecho-
slovakia's reply to the same effect. Id. at 128.
20. Id. at 128. See also the response of the Ukranian SSR. Id. at 127.
21. Id. at 120.
22. Id. at 66.
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to leave the United Nations." 23
It should be borne in mind that the Court has never yet decided a case
which has saved the United Nations from getting into a Third World
War, nor did it stop the Second. Nor has it stopped the situation in
which the big fish have gobbled up the little ones. The technique has
been different.
The United States, by and large, has acted like a mature, grown man.
It has not used the Court at all, either to satisfy its own position or to
destroy that of its enemies. But neither has the Soviet Union. Of course,
it has not allowed disobedience by its satellites. When, in 1968, the
Czechoslovakian republic threatened to get out of line, it simply moved
in and took over. It will not give up its sovereignty nor take a chance on
it.
In the summer of 1965, the American Bar Association adopted a
resolution which stated that, "[t]he International Court of Justice, al-
though now performing a useful function in resolving international dif-
ferences, is not being utilized to its maximum capacity"; that "the
private bar has long been committed to the principle of resolving all
differences, public and private, by sound judicial processes"; and that "a
re-examination of the Statute of the Court may well point to ways and
means of making the Court an institutional structure having greater
usefulness in meeting the requirements for world peace ... "24
On these premises, the American Bar Association recommended "that
the members of the United Nations be asked to consider a revision of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice ... to give the Court
jurisdiction over all members of the United Nations . . . [and to give]
consideration... (1) to the Court being composed of internationalized
judges having tenure for life ... and (2) to prohibiting the over-ruling
of a plea to the jurisdiction on the ground that a controversy is domestic
except by a vote of two-thirds of its entire membership .... ,25
When and if such a revision of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice shall have been effected in accordance with the recommenda-
tion of the American Bar Association, a long firm stride will have been
taken, in the words of the first Article of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, toward "international peace and security", through "prevention
and removal of threats to the peace", by bringing about "adjustment
or settlement of international disputes", in "conformity with the prin-
ciples of justice and international law."
23. Report of the Secretary-General, Review of the Role of the Court of Inter-
national Justice, at 12, 26 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/8382/Add. 1 (1971).
24. 90 A.BaM. REP. 330-31 (1965).
25. Id.

Marriage and Divorce Law in
Sierra Leone: A Microcosm of
African Legal Problems
CHARLES EDWARD DONEGAN*
I. LEGAL PLURALISM AND OTHER PROBLEMS
The single factor that appears to be of outstanding significance in
Africa is that of legal pluralism, the coexistence of a number of legal
systems within a given geographical area. In the countries of North
Africa, Islamic law early replaced most of the indigenous customary
law, but in recent centuries European (particularly French) law has
intruded into many fields, and today we see the beginnings of national
legal systems comprised of principles derived from the concepts of
western and Islamic law. In South Africa, English law has penetrated
into the Roman-Dutch system, while most of the African population
lives according to various systems of customary law. On the other hand,
in tropical Africa, everywhere the indigenous (customary) law exists
alongside the non-indigenous law which was introduced and de-
veloped by the colonial power, at times coexisting together with
Islamic law. The customary law, the non-indigenous western law as
it has been fashioned in the colony, and Islamic law are segments of
the law today. Some should be retained, some modified, still other
segments completely altered to fit the new development of the emerg-
ing states.'
*Assistant Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo; B.S.C.
Roosevelt University, 1954; M.S.I.R. Loyola University (Chicago), 1959; J.D. Howard,
1967; L.L.M. Columbia, 1970; Member, New York and District of Columbia Bars.
1. A. Schiller, The Changes and Adjustments Which Should Be Brought to the
Present Legal Systems of the Countries of Africa to Permit Them to Respond More
Effectively to the New Requirements of the Development of the Countries, in LEGAL
AsPEcrs or ECONossc DEVELOPMENT 193-203 (1966).
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Probably in no area of African law is the problem of legal pluralism
more pronounced nor more dearly demonstrated than in the area of
marriage and divorce. Like other African countries, one of the chief
problems besetting Sierra Leone is the internal conflict of laws. We
are all familiar with the external conflict of laws, but the English
reader is less familiar with internal conflict of laws than his counterpart
in the United States-where internal conflict of laws affects a wide area
of legal matters. An internal conflict case occurs when a judge is re-
quired to choose between two or more systems of law which are not
territorially distinct, i.e., which apply concurrently and without a
single territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, there is an overlap between
one system of law and another, which cannot be removed merely by
drawing a boundary on the ground. Conflicts of this nature have, of
course, arisen in the legal system of British India when judges were
required to decide whether one system of religious personal law or
another (Hindu law or Mohammedan law) should apply to the ex-
clusion of the general law or of each other. In Africa religious personal
law presents less difficulty (except for Islamic law); and most of the
conflicts that arise are between the English or general law and African
customary law. African customary law was in origin a set of tribal laws,
and a member of a tribe would take his tribal law around with him; the
description of such tribal laws as "personal law" was therefore ap-
propriate. Nowadays, however, the effect of the legislation and the
practice of the courts is more and more to make customary law a terri-
torial rather than a personal law.2
Internal conflict cases may involve Choice of Courts, i.e., deciding
whether the non-native courts or the native courts have jurisdiction
over a particular case or type of case, and whether one court or another
within the indicated system shall have jurisdiction in the instant case
(in this regard territorial jurisdiction becomes especially relevant), or
Choice of Law, i.e., deciding which system of law to apply to the de-
termination of a particular case.
The possible types of conflict involving choice of law in the African
territories are English law versus indigenous law (African or Islamic),
African law versus Islamic, and intertribal conflict of laws, in which
the choice is between two kinds of African law.3 An increasingly com-
mon example of the latter type is the case in which a man and a woman
who belong to different African tribes may contract a marriage, ostensibly
in accordance with native law, but without any clear indication as to
2. A. ALLOTr, ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAW 154-55 (1960).
3. Id. at 155-56.
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which native law is applicable. 4
Historically, the chief techniques utilized to bring about evolution
of the law are legislation, restatement, judicial interpretation, and
juristic opinions.5 Legislation is probably the best and quickest means
to bring about uniformity in diverse legal rules. Recommendations for
legislative changes follow later.
Two important problems concerning African marriage are polygamous
marriages and the scantiness of the African viewpoint on marriage. For
example, should there be any allowances for polygamy in the planning
of a new social system? It is one thing to tolerate the continuance of
polygamy under customary law, as the majority of governments still
do; it is quite another thing to include it in the design for a new,
non-traditional order of society.6 There is a paucity of information
as to what Africans themselves think and feel with regard to these
matters. African public opinion has not yet had time to adjust itself
to the pace and direction of modern changes. The masses of the people
are still attached to their traditional institutions and unconvinced of
the impossibility of preserving the substance of customary marriage
apart from its traditional setting. Even though the decisive influence
is more likely to be that of an educated and sophisticated minority,
Africans of this class, to date, perhaps owing to their preoccupation with
political questions, have devoted little consideration to the reshaping
of their private law or the reintegration of their social system.7
Smooth administration of justice in most parts of Africa has been
persistently difficult because the customary laws of its various peoples
have been unwritten. This was a problem not only to the judges in
determining the law, but also to advocates in advising their clients.
Most important, unwritten customary law was the biggest stumbling
block to reform since it was hardly possible to initiate sound reforms
without a complete knowledge and understanding of it.8 Until very re-
cently, those who administered justice in the native or customary courts
relied on their own understanding of the customary law or the opinions
of traditional experts; however the superior and subordinate courts
staffed by professional judges or magistrates relied on the evidence of
local experts setting out the applicable customary law , until such time
as the customary law had been proved so frequently before the courts
4. A. PHILLIPS, SuRVYz OF AFRICAN MARRIAGE AND FAmILY LAW 185 (1953).
5. A. Schiller, supra note 1, at 194-95.
6. A. Phillips, supra note 4, at xl.
7. Id. at xli.
8. Njonjo, Foreward to Cotran, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DivoRcE, 1 RE ATEm EzT
OF AFRICAN LAW (1968).
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that judicial notice might be taken of it. Legal textbooks were rare and
the attempt to use anthropological writings, where they existed and
where their use was permitted by the law, was not always successful,
chiefly because these works were prepared for different purposes by
persons who had no training in legal thought or language.9 Lack of
certainty in the customary law was not, however, the only difficulty.
The multiplicity of customary laws in force in the same country, the
difficulty of harmonizing the institutions and principles of customary
law with those of the imported and general law of western origin, and
the desire to reform, and where possible unify, the local customary
laws as part of a larger exercise in national development were all
reasons why governments have found the ascertainment of customary law
a vital task which cannot be delayed without damage to their am-
bitious programs of social and economic reform.10
With respect to the future direction of African law, given the
plurality of legal systems in most of the territories of Africa-the co-
existence of one or more indigenous legal systems (perhaps involving
Islamic law) with a non-indigenous legal system accommodated to local
circumstances-there are three major possibilities for the course of
legal development. First, the pluralism of law may continue, either
purposely adopted by the authorities or simply persisting in the ab-
sence of any change of policy. Second, a new state may select one of the
component elements of a plural legal structure to the exclusion of the
others. Third, there may occur a fusion of the elements of the plural
legal system into a single national legal system, a process which would
normally call for the directed evolution of the indigenous law, integrat-
ing it with the non-indigenous law into a modern legal structure.
Nqw that legal pluralism and other problems common to all Black
African Countries have been discussed, we can focus on a single country
that is a microcosm of such problems: Sierra Leone.
II. JUDICIAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS IN SIERRA LEONE
Sierra Leone comprises: (a) an area consisting of Freetown and
its immediate environs, formerly known as the "Colony"; and (b) an
area formerly known as the "Protectorate."" The country became in-
9. Id. at vii.
10. Id.
11. Schiller, Law, THE AFRICAN WORLD: A SURVEY OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 176 (R. A.
Lystod ed. 1965).
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dependent on April 27, 1961, and the former Colony and Protectorate
thereupon ceased to exist as such. However, the existing laws of the
former Colony and Protectorate of Sierra Leone continue in force
in Sierra Leone until repealed 12 and references in such laws to the
"Colony" and "Protectorate" are to be taken as references to the areas
in the former Colony and Protectorate respectively. 13
The Courts consist of:
A. Courts primarily administering the general law:
(a) the Privy Council;
(b) the Court of Appeal of Sierra Leone;
(c) the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone;
(d) the Magistrates' Court in the (former) Colony and Protectorate.
B. Courts primarily administering African customary law:
(a) the Local Appeals Division of the Supreme Court;
(b) District Appeal Courts;
(c) Group Local Appeal Courts;
(d) Local Courts.14
A. COURTS ADMINISTERING GENERAL LAW
1. The Privy Council
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is the final court of
appeal. Appeals may be taken from decisions of the Court of Appeal
to Her Majesty in Council as a matter of right and with leave of the
Court of Appeal.'5
2. The Court of Appeal
Established by the Constitution,' 6 this body consists of a President
and persons holding the offices of the Chief Justice and the Puisne (i.e.,
Associate Judge), Judges of the Supreme Court, who are judges of the
Court of Appeal ex officio, and such number, if any, of other judges
as may be prescribed by Parliament. It has such jurisdiction and powers
as may be conferred upon it by the Constitution or any other law.
12. S. L. CONsr., 1961, No. 741, sched. 2, § 1, art. 4.
13. S. L. CONST., 1961, sched. 1, pt. V.
14. A. ALLorr, JUDICIAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICA 9-24 (2d. ed. 1970). H. M.
Joko Smart, Lecturer in Law, University College of Sierra Leone at Fourah Bay,
presents an excellent discussion of the judicial and legal system of Sierra Leone.
15. S. L. CONS., 1961, No. 741, sched. 2, § 1, art. 84, as amended by Courts Act,
1965 (No. 31 of 1965) §§ 70-73.
16. Id. § 79, as amended by Courts Act, 1965 (No. 31 of 1965) § 30.
Cornell International Law Journal/Vol. 5, No. 1
3. The Supreme Court
Established by the Constitution,17 this body is a superior court of
record and consists of the Chief Justice and such number of Puisne
Judges as may be prescribed by Parliament.
The Supreme Court has such original jurisdiction as is conferred
upon it by the Constitution' 8 or any other law. It has no jurisdiction
in regard to any question arising exclusively between natives which re-
lates to marriage or divorce by native customary law or any matrimonial
claim founded on such a marriage.
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction to hear and determine
all appeals from the Magistrates' Courts. Appeals from the decision of
the Supreme Court go to the Court of Appeals. 9
The bodies of law administered by the Supreme Court are the general
law, the customary law, and Islamic law.
General Law includes the Common Law, the doctrines of equity, and
the statutes of general application in force in England on the first day
of January 1880.20
Customary law prevails insofar as it is not repugnant to natural
justice, equity, and good conscience nor incompatible with any
Ordinance applying in the Protectorate. Native customary law shall,
except where the circumstances, nature, or justice of the case otherwise
requires, be deemed applicable in all causes and matters where the
parties thereto are natives, and also between natives and non-natives
where substantial injustice would be done to any party by a strict ad-
herence to the rules of any law other than native customary law-unless
the parties agreed that the transaction should be regulated exclusively
by English law.21
The only specific mention of Islamic law in the Ordinances of Sierra
Leone is in the Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance, No. 20 of 1905.
The relevant provision is section 3 which stipulates that "[p]roof ac-
cording to Mohammedan Law of the existence, past or present, of a
Mohammedan marriage or divorce shall be received in evidence by all
Courts in the Colony and by any person having, by law or consent of
parties, authority to hear and examine witnesses. '22
17. Id. art. 75 (1), (4).
18. Id. art. 75 (1).
19. Courts Act, 1965, pts. II-IV (S.L.).
20. Id. § 74.
21. Id. § 76 (1)-(3).
22. Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 96 (S.L.).
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4. Magistrates' Courts
Magistrates' Courts are courts of record. The three classes of magis-
trates' courts are: ordinary magistrates' courts, special magistrates'
courts sitting in the Western Area, and juvenile courts.23
At least one Magistrates' Court is established in each of Sierra Leone's
judicial Districts. 24
Sitting as an ordinary court, a magistrates' court is composed of a
single magistrate. As a special court for the administration of customary
law, it consists of at least two special justices of the peace, one of whom
must be the Chairman, together with two assessors selected by the
Chairman from a list of experts in customary law drawn up by the
Chief Justice.2- A juvenile court normally comprises a single magistrate
and two or more justices of the peace.2 6
Magistrates' Courts have original jurisdiction only. Subject to the
provisions the Courts Act of 1965, section 7 (1), every Magistrates' Court
has jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil and criminal matters
arising within the district or transferred to it by the Supreme Court.
Every such Court has jurisdiction to hear: (a) in the (former) Colony
-any cause other than an action founded upon libel, slander, false im-
prisonment, malicious prosecution, seduction, or breach of promise
of marriage wherein the claim does not exceed 200 pounds in value; and
(b) in the (former) Protectorate-any cause or matter other than libel,
slander, etc., where such matter is between other than two natives.
No cause or matter which is within the Civil jurisdiction of Magistrates'
Courts or of the Combined Courts established under the Native Courts
Ordinance, and to which one of the parties is a non-native, shall be instituted
in any other Court.27
Appeals from the decisions of the Magistrates' Courts are heard and
determined by the Supreme Court.28 The Magistrates' Courts have no
powers of review, revision, inspection, or supervision.
The Supreme Court has the power to transfer any civil cause before
a Magistrates' Court either to the Supreme Court itself or to another
Magistrates' Court. Any criminal proceedings before a Magistrates'
Court can be transferred from that Court to any other Magistrates'
23. These are established under the Courts Act, 1965, the Courts Act Amendment
Decree, 1967, and the Childrens and Young Persons Ordinance (Cap. 44 of the
revised laws of Sierra Leone), respectively.
24. Courts Act, 1965, §§ 3-5 (S.L.).
25. Courts Act Amendment Decree 1967, § 1 (S.L.).
26. Laws of Sierra Leone, 1960, Cap. 44, § 4.
27. Courts Act, 1965, § 1 (S.L.).
28. Id. §§ 42-52.
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Court for hearing and determination. 29
Magistrates administer the same law as does the Supreme Court,
i.e., the general, customary, and Islamic law.
B. COURTS ADMINISTERING AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW
1. The Local Appeals Division of the Supreme Court
The Local Appeals Division of the Supreme Court was established
by the Local Courts Act, 1963.30
The Court consists of a judge of the Supreme Court sitting with two
assessors selected by him from a list of experts in customary law drawn
up by the Judicial Adviser. The assessors operate in a purely advisory
capacity and the decision of the Court is vested exclusively in the judge.3'1
The Court hears appeals from decisions of the District Appeal Court.8 2
It has no original jurisdiction.
Appeal from the Local Division of the Supreme Court lies the
Court of Appeal.
The Court administers the general Law,23 customary Law,3' and
Islamic Law.35
2. District Appeal Courts
The District Appeal Courts were established by the Local Courts
Act, 196336 and are found in every district of the province.
The Court is composed of the police magistrate of the district who
sits with two assessors selected by him from a list of experts in customary
law drawn up by the District Officers. The services of the assessors are
dispensed with where the Court is not likely to deal with any question
of customary law.3 7 The Court's decision is vested exclusively in the
Magistrate.38
The Court determines appeals from the decisions of both Local
Courts and the Group Local Courts.3 9 The Court has no original jurisdic-
tion.
29. Id. § 10.
30. Local Courts Act, 1963, § 31 (S.L.).
31. Id. § 31 (1).
32. Id.
33. Courts Act, 1965, § 74 (S.L.).
34. Id. §§ 76 (I)-(3).
35. Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 96 (S.L.).
36. Local Courts Act, 1963, § 29(1) (S.L.).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 29 (2).
39. Id. §§ 29, 30.
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Appeal from the District Appeal Court lies with the Local Division of
the Supreme Court. If a case is governed by the general law, the con-
ditions of appeal are the same as those governing appeals from magis-
trates' courts. However, where the case is governed by customary law
and the proceedings are civil, an appeal lies as a matter of right from
questions of both law and fact. In a criminal case, an appeal lies without
leave on any ground of appeal which involves solely a question of law.4 0
The Court administers the general law,4' customary law,42 and
Islamic law.43
3. Group Local Appeal Court
A Group Local Appeal Court is a joint Court for two or more
Chiefdoms in the Provinces. Originally, it was established as a Group
Native Appeal Court under the Native Court Ordinance.4 4 The Court
has been renamed Group Local Appeal Court.4 5 The Native Courts
Ordinance has been repealed and superceded by the Local Courts Act,
1963. However, all Local Courts and Group Local Appeal Courts in
existence immediately before the latter Act were not affected by the
repeal except as was expressly provided in the Act.4 6
The Court is composed of a Paramount Chief or his deputy and one
or more representatives of each chiefdom of the group.47 The govern-
ment minister responsible for legal and judicial matters has the power
to appoint a President and one or more Vice-Presidents of the Court.4 8
Presently, the trend is to exclude Paramount Chiefs from both the
Presidency and Vice-Presidency.4 9
The Court has the same original jurisdiction and powers generally
exercised by the former Native Courts according to native law and
custom.50 The Court has the power to hear and determine appeals from
decisions of Local Courts. 1
40. Id. § 31 (1).
41. Courts Act, 1965, § 74 (S.L.).
42. Local Courts Act, 1963, § 2 (S.L.).
43. Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 96 (S.L.).
44. Native Courts Ordinance, Cap. 8, § 14 (S.L.).
45. Local Courts Act, 1963, § 3 (S.L.).
46. Id. § 50 (1)(a).
47. Native Courts Ordinance, § 15 (S.L.).
48. Local Courts Act, 1963, § 4 (S.L.), as amended by Local Courts Amendment Act,
1966, § 1 (S.L.).
49. Smart, The Local Court System in Sierra Leone, 22 SIEJRRA LEONE STUoms 43
(undated).
50. See Native Courts Ordinance, § 17 (S.L.).
51. Local Courts Act, 1963, § 30 (S.L.).
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Appeal from a Group Local Appeal Court lies with the District
Court.
5 2
The Judicial Adviser or a District Officer has access to Group Local
Appeal Courts and all books, records, and other documents in their
custody. They may of their own motion review any decision of such
Courts, whether civil or criminal, where a prima facie case of miscar-
riage of justice is disclosed or an obvious error is to be corrected. 53 How-
ever, the power of review is not exercised where an appeal is pending. 54
Furthermore, notice of intention to review is given to the Court and
the parties concerned. 55
At the conclusion of each session of a Group Local Appeal Court, the
Registrar forwards to the Judicial Adviser and the District Officer a
complete list of all appeals decided or commenced before the Court
during that session. 56
The Court administers the general law,57 customary law,58 and
Islamic law.59
4. Local Courts
Native Courts were established under the Native Courts Ordinance. 00
A Native Court is now redesignated Local Court.6' Combined Courts
which seemed to have been included within the description of Native
Courts have now fallen into desuetude.
Local Courts consist of Local Courts presently existing according to
native law and custom and also such other Local Courts as may be
established.6 2 Tribunals such as Headman's and subchiefs' courts have
been erroneously thought to be Local Courts.63 Judicial power was
taken away from these Courts long ago.64 Today, the only recognized
Local Courts are the Courts of the Paramount Chiefs sitting with two or
more tribal authorities.
52. Id. § 30(2).
53. Id. § 36.
54. Id. § 37.
55. Id. § 38.
56. Id. § 35 (2).
57. Id. § 2.
58. Id.
59. Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 96 (S.L.).
60. Id. Cap. 8, § 7.
61. Local Courts Act, 1963, § 3 (S.L.). Note that the Local Courts Act, 1963, §
50 (1) (S.L.) applies to Group Local Appeal Courts as well as to Local Courts.
62. Native Courts Ordinance, Cap. 8, § 7, as amended by Local Courts Act, 1963,§ 3 (S.L.).
63. Daniels, Sierra Leone, in JUDICIAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICA 18 (1962).
64. Smart, supra note 49, at 35-36.
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A Local Court has original jurisdiction to: (a) administer decedents'
estates governed by customary law; (b) hear and determine all civil cases
governed by customary law other than cases between Paramount Chiefs
or tribal authorities involving title to land and all civil cases governed
by general law involving relatively small amounts of money; and (c)
hear and determine all criminal cases where the maximum punish-
ment does not exceed a fine of two hundred leones or imprisonment for
a period of one year or both.65 Local Courts have no appellate jurisdic-
tion.
Appeal from a Local Court lies to the Group Local Appeal Court or
directly to the District Appeal Court.66
Both the Judicial Adviser and a District Appeal Court have the
power, on their own motion or on the application of a Local Court or
any party to the proceedings for reasonable cause, to transfer a case
initiated before a Local Court. The case can be transferred to a different
Local Court, a magistrates' court, or the District Appeal Court. The
transferred case then proceeds de novo.67
The Clerk of each Local Court, within seven days after the end of
each month, forwards to the Judicial Adviser and the District Officer
a complete list of all cases decided or commenced in the Local Court
during the month.68
The bodies of law administered by the Local Courts are the general
law, customary law, and Islamic law.
General law applies where there is no provision for customary law.
General law includes the common law, equity, and all enactments in
force in Sierra Leone except insofar as they are concerned with cus-
tomary law.69
Customary law is the primary law of the Court.70 Customary law
means any rule, other than a rule of general law, having the force of
law in any chiefdom of the Provinces which is applicable in any case
and conforms with natural justice and equity and is not incompatible
with any enactment applying to the Provinces.71 The Local Court also
administers Islamic Law.7 2
65. Local Courts Act, 1963, § 13 (S.L.), as amended by Local Courts Amendment
Act, 1965, § 5 (S.L.).
66. Id. §§ 29 (, 30(l).
67. Id. § 14 (2).
68. Id. § 35(1).
69. Id. § 2.
70. Id. § 13(2).
71. Id. § 2.
72. Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 96 (S.L.).
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO EFFECT AN
INTEGRATED AND IMPROVED JUDICIAL AND LEGAL
SYSTEM IN SIERRA LEONE
The customary courts should become a part of an integrated judicial
system in the Protectorate.7 3 These courts are no longer referred to as
Native Courts. The term "native" had aroused negative feelings because
it is reminiscent of the old title "native affairs." The word was thought
to have a derogatory sense when used generically. The present term
"local" court had been suggested earlier but discarded as being as color-
less as the term "native." The term "Customary Courts" is preferable
and should raise the status of courts applying customary law (which
will become the common law). This has already occurred in other
countries. They apply customary law as the fundamental law whereas
the other set of courts primarily administer English law.
The first legislation concerning native courts was passed in 1896. The
hinterland had been declared a Protectorate by the Proclamation of
1896. A Commission of Inquiry appointed in 1898 reported that the only
practical form of government was administration through the Chiefs.
Legislation was enacted between 1901 and 1905 as the foundation of a
system of native administration. Chiefdom Courts were recognized,
but no provision was made for the supervision of their proceedings. This
only amounted to leaving jurisdiction where native law and custom had
placed it. 4
About the same time, Combined Courts also administering native law
and custom were established for minor cases between non-natives and
natives. Due to local conditions and history, the Chiefdom Courts
became entrenched as a more systematic tribunal with an effective, al-
though primitive, procedure. There was little contact with the outside
world. There was no interference with Chiefdom affairs other than to
prevent abuses. These factors contributed to the fixation of native law
and custom.
Part of a general reorganization of the system of native administration,
the Native Courts Ordinance No. 40 of 1932 provided for three classes
of native courts: Courts of native chiefs, referred to as Native Courts,
which include Chiefdom Courts and subordinate courts, Native Appeal
Courts, and Combined Courts.
73. L. BROOKE, REPORT ON THE NATIVE COURT SYSTEM IN SIERRA LEONE 57 (1955).
74. Id.
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In general, the Chiefdom Courts conduct their proceedings with dig-
nity, have the confidence of the public, and are useful beyond merely per-
forming their judicial duties. However, there is an increasing demand
that their procedure be improved. The administration of justice is
centered in the Chiefdom. Therefore, it is desirable to retain the au-
thoritative and representative character of these courts when introducing
some of the legal mechanisms of a more institutionalized system. Event-
ually the judiciary must be separated from the executive. In time public
duties will prevent the Chief from giving much of his time to judicial
duties. At present, too much depends on the Chief, and his duties must
be distributed. However, the close association between tribal authority
and court can only be relaxed gradually and with understanding.
There has been a great advance in establishing the position of District
Councils, and their influence over tribal authorities can perhaps be
extended to take charge of the administrative function of the courts.
Aside from the matter of expense, the Chiefdom Courts must remain as
the local courts of lower jurisdiction. They will become the petty ses-
sional courts. Their present powers are generally thought to be exces-
sive. Additionally, there is a need for a graduated system of courts, as is
the usual African practice. Under such an arrangement, a higher grade
district court is also known as a customary court but is more strongly
constituted in that it can also act as a Native Court of Appeal from the
Chiefdom Courts. The district courts have largely taken the place of the
present Combined Courts. Only one of the Combined Courts now sits
regularly-its jurisdiction gives it no scope, its bench is not specialized,
and its utility is restricted by its cumbrous procedure.
The aim of Sierra Leone and other Black African nations must be
the fusion of the dual organization of Customary and English Courts
and law into an integrated system. The Native Court will, most likely, be
the important factor in the fusion of the two sets of courts and will act
in the nature of a filtering process. Customary law has shown few signs
of development from within and the tendency will be to supplement the
residium of native law and custom by legislation. Rather than by em-
powering the native courts to enforce the provisions of the Sierre Leone
Ordinances, legislation should occur as tribal authority, bylaws or rules
made by District Councils. This will bridge the gap between the two
systems and make the departure from essentially traditional, social sanc-
tions to the imposition of an institutionalized level of law.75
The Courts are unwieldy and need to become more specialized. The
75. Id. at 58.
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use of assessors could be helpful both for their educative effect and as a
safeguard for the independent development of native law. The Court's
effectiveness is hampered by the lack of personnel. The general advance-
ment has brought an increase in literacy and thus in initiative and
impatience with the lack of improvement in a system which must
continue to try the bulk of the criminal and civil cases in the former
Protectorate. At present it is usual to rely on the District Officer.
Some suitable person, such as a government pensioner, retired business-
man, or hopefully a qualified lawyer, should assume the magisterial
duties of the District Officer.
Although the time for a complete separation of executive and judiciary
may not have arrived, the goal must be to bring together the parallel
systems of court and law. However, the useful features of the traditional
system must be preserved until they become outmoded. Another concern
should be to guard against changing too abruptly an organized system
which has taken centuries to develop. Consequently, much depends on
the composition of local courts. Therefore, members and officers of these
courts should be trained. A new section in the Ordinance can be added
to relieve anxiety as to the exercise of powers and to protect members
and officers acting in good faith.7 6
With respect to jurisdiction, the general principle of all persons being
subject to native tribunals must be controlled by the law to be applied
and by the competency of the court involved. The liberal exercise of the
power of transfer guarantees that only cases that are properly cognisable
by local courts should go before them. On application by a party, an in-
quiry by the Supreme Court or Magistrates' Court as to whether a person
is subject to the jurisdiction of those courts would operate as a stay of
proceeding pending the determination of such issue. There are few
such applications. Conversely, a native should have the same power.
Both the criminal and civil jurisdiction of Local Courts, which are the
local and static courts and will become petty sessional, are too high.
Local Courts should be graded because grading is an incentive to im-
provement and the highest grade district court, which would tour, might
take the cases beyond the local courts' competence. Magistrates' Courts
would be fully occupied in the commercial centers. The Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction would be limited in practice to cases beyond the com-
petence of the higher grade district native court and the Magistrates'
Court and in land causes to cases transferred by the District Officer to




The law to be administered in the local courts must continue to be
native law and custom, bylaws made by tribal authorities, and rules made
by District Councils, whose power in this area should be extended. Pro-
visions of local Ordinances should be enforced by district courts and any
Chiefdom Courts which are capable of doing so. Jurisdiction should be
conferred only for competence and not for convenience. Courts should
have copies of all legislation that they are empowered to administer.
The practice and procedure of administering oaths in the form of self-
imprecation charged with punishing power are primitive but will con-
tinue to be effective as long as the belief remains in the power of the
"swear." Administrative officers have introduced a simplified English
procedure and the practice is in a transitional stage. The Local Courts
require simple rules of procedure and evidence. Records of Local Court
cases are inadequate. The appointment of the Local Courts advisor
should improve this situation.
Everywhere the enforcement of judgments and orders has encountered
difficulties. To remedy this situation, new ancillary powers should be
included in the Ordinance and provisions should be made in the rules of
court for execution against property. Parties should appear in person in
court proceedings. If a party is unavoidably absent, a relative or other
non-attorney representative should be allowed to appear for him. The
lack of such provision is causing too many adjournments. Legal prac-
titioners should continue to be excluded from the audience.
Control of Local Courts with respect to their Constitution and com-
position must remain with the administrative staff until the District
Councils can perform such executive functions. The appointment of
members should be made by the Provincial Officer. Such appointments
should be made on the advice of the District Officer after consulting
the District Council. By the same token, the revisionary power over
Local Courts decisions, both original and appellate, should be retained
and limited to cases where there is grave miscarriage of justice or clerical
errors on the record. Such power should be exercised by the Provincial
Officer (if he has not sat as President of the native court) and perhaps
the Local Courts Adviser. Since transfers are of such importance in a dual
system of courts and law, a separate section has been included in a new
Local Courts Ordinance which provides for the free exercise of such
power and prescribes the effect of an order or transfer. Appointment
of a Local Courts Adviser with advisory duties would be very beneficial.
At present the provision for appeals in the Ordinance is limited to:
(a) an automatic appeal to the District Officer in a case involving a
sentence over fourteen days; and (b) a Group Local Appeal Court
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which serves as an appeal court for a small group of Chiefdoms who
agree to such arrangements. The latter failed in the one case where it
was established and so far gives little promise of success. The Local
Court of Appeal is considered the point of integration in a dual court
system. It should consist of a more highly qualified bench and be pre-
sided over by the District Officer or other suitable person. A further ap-
peal, restricted by a ceiling of penalty or value of subject matter, would
be to the Supreme Court or Court of Appeal. 7"
IV. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LAWS OF SIERRA LEONE-
EXISTING LAW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
A. AN OVERVIEW
The study of African family law provides one of the best introductions
to the problematic nature of African legal systems. Most of the difficulties of
legal interpretation and application in Africa result from the mixing of
colonial and indigenous laws, but there are few areas where these difficulties
are so magnified as in those laws relating to marriage and divorce.78
Sierra Leone, like other English speaking African states, owes part of
its system of law to English common and statutory law and consequently
suffers the inevitable conflicts that result from the application of such
law to a citizen widely separated from his English counterpart in customs,
language, traditions, and temperament.7 9
Sierra Leone is similar to Ghana and Gambia in that it has an
operative ordinance for the marriage and divorce of Mohammedans; this
is why polygamy in certain instances is not a ground for divorce. The
laws of Sierra Leone with respect to monogamy and polygamy are very
comprehensive.8 0
The principal ordinance of Sierra Leone (Cap. 97) is nearly identical
to the Kenya ordinance. Sierra Leone is also similar to Kenya in that
77. Id. at 59.
78. Stibich, Family Law in Some English Speaking African States, 2 AFRICAN LAw
STnzs 49 (1969).
79. Id.
80. Sierra Leone has its own Causes Laws and is not under English law as is Ghana,
Gambia, Liberia, Nigeria, and Zambia.
Laws of Sierra Leone as amended.
Christian Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 95, as amended by Act No. 48 of 1965.
Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 96.
Civil Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 97, as amended by No. 49 of 1965.
Foreign Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 98.
Marriage of British Subjects Ordinance, Cap. 99.
Married Woman's Maintainence Ordinance, Cap. 100.
Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, Cap. 102, as amended by Act. No. 16 of 1961.
Evidence (Marital Intercourse) Ordinance, Cap. 103.
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there is no written law with respect to marriage between indigenous
people. Nor in either country is there a provision for registration of
customary marriages.
Some of the chief indigenous tribes in Sierra Leone are the Timne,
Susu, Loko, Limba, Yalunka, Koranko, Keno, Mendi, Cola, and Kisi.
A 1916 anthropological study of the indigenous people of Sierra
Leone reported:
Compared with the Nigerian tribes, the marriage customs of Sierra Leone ap-
pear to be extremely simple. Only one form of marriage-by purchase-is
known; and though the wife may leave the husband, when she has borne
many children, on payment of one kola, her position corresponds in reality
to that of the bond wife (amoia) of the Edo-speaking peoples; for her chil-
dren belong to her husband's clan and remain his property if she leaves him.81
Cross-cousin marriage and other special forms seem to be unknown to
the Timne-most first cousins are not eligible wives, though a mother's
brother's daughter might be chosen. Widows are a form of property. A
man can marry his father's brother's wife. A man can marry his mother's
brother's wife or his mother's father's wife (but not his own grand-
mother).
When a woman leaves or is driven out by her husband, and she goes to
a new husband, the latter pays a bride-price to the former; otherwise
circumstances determine whether the parents repay the first husband or
not. However, the wife must leave behind what she earned in the hus-
band's house.
If a wife leaves her husband, the bride price is repaid unless she has
children. If she goes directly to another husband, the latter is liable for a
fine for adultery.
Divorce under indigenous law can be justified for the following rea-
sons: idleness, theft, slandering the husband, or doing witchcraft in the
house. However, a husband cannot claim refund of the bride price. If the
woman goes to another husband, the children are his. In some places the
wife can take the children if her husband divorces her.8 2
B. MINIMUM AGE
Under the present civil, Christian, Mohammadan, or indigenous law,
there is no statutory minimum age for marriage.s 3 Also, child marriages
are permissible under Islamic and indigenous law.8 4 The reason for fix-
81. J. THOMAS, AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL REPORT ON SIERRA LEONE, PART I, LAW AND
CusToM OF THE TIMNE AND OTHER TunEs 91 (1916).
82. Id. at 92-100.
83. Laws of Sierra Leone, Caps. 95-97.
84. J. FENTON, OUTLINE or NATIVE LAW IN SIERRA LEONE 23 (1948).
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ing minimum ages is to allow time for more education; a man should
be old enough to support a wife, and a woman should have enough ex-
perience to manage a household. Persons should have the maturity of
judgment to choose a life long partner.
Therefore, it is recommended that there should be a statutory mini-
mum age for marriage, applying to all communities, of 18 for males
and 16 for females.
Courts should be given discretion to allow persons to marry below
the minimum age in extraordinary circumstances. This would be to en-
able children to be legitimate and relieve families from shame and hu-
miliation. An objection is that it might seem to be condoning sexual
intercourse between young people. A marriage where either party is be-
low the minimum age is not likely to have the necessary ingredients for
stability and may not be in the best interests of the State, the parties, or
the unborn child. Whereas it is desirable to give a court such power
where pregnancy is involved, it should not be a matter of course and
never given where either party is less than 14 years of age.8 5
C. PROHIBITED DEGREES OF AFFINITY
Under the Christian Marriage and Civil Marriage laws, marriage may
not be celebrated between persons who are related within the prohibited
degrees of consanguinity or affinity according to the law of England.8 0
Prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity are much wider
than in continental Europe. A direct relationship through the female
line is a bar to marriage; for example, a man may not marry his mother's
sister or his mother's sister's daughter. Nor may he marry his whole
or half sister.
Probably among the Lemnes, as well as among tribes where there is
Mohammadan influence, marriage between members of the same clan
was formerly prohibited. As clans grow larger, the rule of exogamy falls
into disuse.
Under existing indigenous law, a man may take his deceased father's
wives, except of course, his own mother. But, where there is Moham-
madan influence, the deceased's wives now often fall to his brother.8 7
It is recommended that any marriage that would not be within the
prohibited degrees in England be considered as lawful. Also a deceased's
85. KENYA, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 16-19
(1968) [hereinafter cited as KENYA REPORT].
86. Christian Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 95, § 7 (S.L.). See also Civil Marriage
Ordinance, Cap. 97, § 7 (S.L.).
87. KENYA REPORT, supra note 85, at 28.
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wives should not be compelled to live with his son or brothers.
The present situation is not satisfactory. To begin with, it seems
that parties' capacity to marry may depend on the form of marriage
chosen. Also, prohibiting marriages where there is a remote blood
relationship may cause uncertainty as to the validity of marriages. The
relationship may not be known to the parties and may not be dis-
covered until long after the marriage. It is of the greatest importance
that there be certainty as to marital status. There should be a single
uniform rule applying to members of all communities prescribing the
degrees of relationship within which marriage is prohibited by law.
Such a rule should only specify those relationships prohibited by all
communities and should be more tolerant than the rules of any par-
ticular community. Although some people will regard such a rule as being
too liberal, the consciences of individuals and the social pressures within
communities will generally insure compliance with religious and tra-
ditional rules. Therefore, there will be no need for legal sanctions. This
proposal would lead to certainty in the law as well as flexibility in re-
gard to religious and customary rules.
It is recommended that a statute, applying to persons of all races,
tribes, and religions, prohibit marriages between a person and his grand-
parent, parent, child or grandchild, great aunt or great uncle, aunt or
uncle, niece or nephew, great niece or great nephew as the case may be.
Also, no person should be allowed to marry the grandparent or parent,
child or grandchild of his or her spouse or former spouse. No person
should be allowed to marry the former spouse of his or her grandparent
or parent, child or grandchild.
No one should be allowed to marry a person whom he or she had
adopted or by whom he or she was adopted.
Relationship of the half blood should be treated the same as full
blood, and it should be immaterial whether a person was born legitimate
or illegitimate.
Any ceremony purporting to be a marriage involving parties within
the prohibited degrees should be a nullity. Children of such a void union
should be deemed legitimate. It should be an offence to participate
knowingly in such a ceremony.88
D. MONOGAMY AND POLYGAMY
Although the English law conception of marriage is, according to
88. Id. at 19-20.
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the famous dictum of Sir J. P. Wilde in Hyde v. Hyde, the voluntary
union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others,
British Colonial Courts were enjoined to recognize polygamy, which is
the usual form of customary marriage in practically all the former
African colonies. Such recognition entails all the legal consequences of
ordinary English law marriages and is therefore not restricted only to
matters of status and succession, as it is in English Courts sitting in
England over cases involving polygamy. Indeed, for most purposes, a
customary law marriage has legal validity with one celebrated under
a Colonial Marriage Ordinance. It follows, therefore, that it is a
punishable offence-though the point is not always obvious from some
of the Colonial Marriage Ordinances-for anyone who, being previously
married under customary law, goes through a ceremony of marriage
prescribed by the Ordinance, and vice versa.8 9
Such is also the law in Sierra Leone.
Marriages under the Christian and Civil laws must be monogamous. 00
On the other hand, polygamy is permitted under indigenous and Moham-
medan law.
Opponents of polygamy state that older wives are sometimes neglected
while the husband lavishes his attention on the younger wives.
The main argument made for monogamy, aside from religious teach-
ing, is that only in the union of one man and one woman is it possible
to find mutual love and trust essential to a stable and happy home. Some
also believe that the father will prefer children of one wife to those of
another, which will result in jealousy and discord among the children.
Persons favoring polygamy state that it will hold down prostitution.
They also think a man is particularly entitled to a second wife if his
first marriage has been without issue.
Many people, some favoring and others opposing polygamy, believe
the practice will eventually die out under the pressure of social and
economic change.
It is recommended that the law recognize the monogamous and poly-
gamous types of marriage. However, once a person enters into a mono-
gamous form of marriage under Christian or Civil law, he should not be
able to enter into a polygamous marriage later.
Polygamy should in no case be prohibited by law. The effect of such
a law would probably cause considerable social disruption without being
89. Elias, Indigenous Law and its Sphere of Operation, BRrnsH COLONIAL LAW 110
(1962).
90. See Christian Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 95, § 7 (3) (S.L.) and Civil Marriage
Ordinance, Cap. 97, § 15 (b) (S.L.).
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really effective. In addition, it would probably result in an increasing
number of unions that are not lawful marriages and therefore an in-
crease in the number of illegitimate children.
On the other hand, all marriages should not be made potentially
polygamous. This would be a backward step and offensive to a large
segment of the population.
Where a man has two or more wives there should be complete equality
of legal status and legal rights between such wives.
It is generally accepted under Mohammedan and indigenous law that
a man should not take a second wife unless he has the means to support
both wives adequately. 91
E. CONSENT TO MARRIAGE
Under existing indigenous law, the general principle is that marriage
is only marriage when it is with the consent of the woman's parents or
guardians and is contracted in prescribed ways.92
The consent, freely given, of both parties should be essential to the
validity of every marriage. At present it is essential to every Christian
and Civil marriage and to every Moslem marriage where the parties
have attained the age of puberty.9 3
On the other hand, under indigenous law the young girl may be be-
trothed by her parents without her consent, although it has become more
usual to ask for it. The girl may be betrothed at ten years of age or
earlier but usually is not handed over in marriage until she is fourteen or
fifteen.9 4
Any present religious or customary law which allows parents to force
a child into marriage is wrong and should be abrogated.
It is recommended that the consent of both parties freely given be
essential to the validity of a marriage, whether among non-natives or
natives. A ceremony purporting to be a marriage should be a nullity
if the consent of both parties is not freely given. However, any children
by such union should by statute be legitimate.
91. KENYA REPoRT, supra note 85, at 21-28.
92. J. FENTON, supra note 84, at 28.
93. KENYA REPORT, supra note 85, at 28.
94. J. FENTON, supra note 84, at 23.
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The present law requiring parental consent where a party is under
21 years of age should be continued. A person of 18 may be old enough
to enter into ordinary contracts. However, marriage is a kind of contract
which may affect the whole course of a person's life and one which re-
quires maturity of judgment more than intelligence.
Where parental consent is unreasonably withheld or where it is im-
practicable to obtain (for example, where the parents' presence are
unknown) the court should have discretion to give such consent.
Lack of consent (other than consent of the parties themselves) should
not invalidate a marriage. However, the court should have power to
annul such a marriage on the application of an interested person if one
party to the marriage is under 21 years of age. 95
F. DOWRY
Under present indigenous law, after the betrothal presents are given,
the first part of the "head money" or marriage price ("dowry") is pre-
sented. The marriage is valid as soon as the first of this money is ac-
cepted. The marriage price is often paid partly in kind, especially
cattle and country cloths. If, after the first part of the head money is
paid, the woman dies, the husband is expected to complete payment be-
fore burial.
The bride or marriage price is divided as follows: father, one-half;
mother's eldest brother or his representative, one-quarter; and bride's
brother by the same mother, one quarter.
Where a man's wife dies soon after marriage, and especially if the mar-
riage is not yet consummated, he may claim another woman from her
family. They then give him a near female relative. In return he makes
a small payment of perhaps one pound.96
The payment of dowry or marriage price should not be abolished
because it is believed to be a factor making for stability in marriage.97
However, it should merely be a matter of arrangement between the two
families and not a legal requirement.
Although in many indigenous laws the payment of dowry is regarded
as a legal essential, the custom is losing much of its legal significance
and is becoming, like the European dowry, a social custom.
It is recommended that the legal validity of marriage should not
95. KENYA REPORT, supra note 85, at 28-31.
96. J. FENTON, supra note 84, at 24-25.
97. KENYA RPoRT, supra note 85, at 32-33. It is thought to act as a deterrent to
misconduct by the wife since there must be repayment in event of divorce.
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depend on dowry having been paid or promised. Furthermore, the law
should not regulate the amount of the marriage price but should leave
it to agreement between the families concerned.
In addition, no action should lie for the return of dowry after and in
consequence of the death of a wife. Neither should the validity of a
divorce depend on the return of any dowry to the husband or his family.
G. PRELIMINARIES TO MARRIAGE
Under indigenous law, witnesses should be present when preliminary
presents are given and accepted as evidence for the betrothal. 98 Three
months public notice must be given under the Civil Marriage Ordinance
and three weeks notice under the Christian Marriage Ordinance. 99
Secret marriages should not be allowed, and the giving of public
notice is most desirable. This is so mainly that steps may be taken to
prevent the ceremony taking place where there is any lawful impediment
to marriage.
It is recommended that the parties to an intended marriage be
required to give at least 21 days notice before the marriage date, that
such notice be given to a registrar, minister of religion, or the local
Chief or sub-chief and that it be the duty of such registrar or Chief to
make the intention of marriage known locally and, so far as practicable,
when the parents of the parties reside elsewhere, in the places where
they ordinarily reside. 00
H. CELEBRATION OF MARRIAGE
Christian marriage may be used by natives if they wish, but not with-
out publication of bans.' 01 Natives cannot contract a civil marriage be-
fore a registrar. Native authorities still feel that it should be known
to all concerned that the parties intend to marry.102
Non-natives cannot contract marriage with native women except under
Ordinance, for example under Cap. 95 (Christian Marriage). They do
sometimes go through the form of a native marriage. However, they
cannot sue for refund of the marriage money if they are deserted by the
98. J. FENTON, supra note 84, at 24.
99. Civil Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 97, § 6 (S.L.) and Christian Marriage Ordinance,
Cap. 95, § 5 (S.L.).
100. KENYA REPORT, supra note 85, at 36-39.
101. Christian Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 95, § 3 (S.L.).
102. Civil Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 97, § 4 (S.L.).
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women.103
A simple and uniform ceremony as a prerequisite to a valid marriage
is not practicable at this time. Many people in rural areas would not
realize for years that their customary marriages were not valid. In ad-
dition, Moslems and traditionalists would resent the fact that their mar-
riage ceremonies were not valid.
It is therefore recommended that marriages in the future, as at
present, be capable of being contracted by (1) civil form, (2) religious
ceremony, (3) Moslem form or (4) rites recognized by indigenous law.1 0 4
I. REGISTRATION
Under indigenous law, some chiefs might favor registration of native
marriages by a Chiefdom clerk, with a statement agreed on by the
parties as to the value of the first part of the marriage price, when it
was paid, and in whose presence. 0 5
At present there are three systems of registration, one each for Chris-
tian,10 Civil, 0 7 and Mohammedan'0 8 marriages. There is no valid
reason for such separation. The registration of marriage is a civil in-
stead of a religious matter.
All marriages should be registered, and they should be registered
under a single system. Therefore, it is recommended that there be a
single system of registration applying to all persons, regardless of race,
religion, or community. However, the validity of a marriage should
not depend on registration. Furthermore, the new law should permit the
registration of existing, unregistered marriages and the registration of
such marriages should be encouraged but not made compulsory 09
J. BREACH OF PROMISE
Under indigenous law, the proposed marriage may be broken off. The
girl may dislike and refuse the marriage, or the parents may give her to
a richer suitor who comes on the scene after the betrothal. The native
court may award the rejected suitor damages. In either event, he is en-
103. J. FENTON, supra note 84, at 30.
104. KENYA REPORT, supra note 85, at 39-40.
105. J. FENTON, supra note 84, at 24.
106. Christian Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 95, § 11 (S.L.).
107. Civil Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 97, § 16 (S.L.).
108. Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 96, § 5 (SL.).
109. KENYA REPORT, supra note 85, at 46-48.
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titled to a return of his contributions. 110
Under the Christian Marriage Ordinance, a person aggrieved may sue
to recover damages in any court for breach of promise or for seduction."'
It is recommended that the action for breach of promise be abolished
because damages are too conjectural and because the action for breach of
promise exposes a person to false accusations.
K. SEDUCTION AND ADULTERY
Under indigenous law, if a virgin is seduced by one who is not the
prospective husband, her parents can sue him for "spoiling the mar-
riage," i.e., spoiling her prospects and theirs, and would obtain sub-
stantial damages (virgin money). In addition, the court may order the
seducer to pay damages to the man to whom she is betrothed. Or the man
to whom she is betrothed may call upon her family to pay compensation
or may demand repayment of whatever has been paid of the marriage
price.
If the woman is married, the husband sues the seducer for "woman
damage" which may vary from 10s to 30s, according to the offender's
behavior and repentence. The usual procedure is that, if the woman takes
an oath that she had intercourse with A, A is required to pay, whether
he admits or denies the seduction. A woman cannot be obliged to take
an oath without her family's consent, and she may refuse to take an
oath if she is pregnant. On rare occasions, A takes an oath denying
guilt, on the husband's "medicine," and pays nothing."12
Under the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance" 3 a husband may, on a
petition for divorce or for judicial separation or for damages only,
claim damages from any person on the ground of adultery with pe-
titioner's wife. The court may direct in what manner the damages re-
covered on such petition are to be paid or applied and may direct the
whole or any part of the damages to be settled for the benefit of the
children, if any, of the marriage, or as a provision for the maintenance
of the wife.
It is recommended that a wife should have a right of action for dam-
ages against a woman with whom her husband has committed adultery.
110. J. FENTON, supra note 84, at 24.
111. Christian Marriage Ordinance, Cap. 95, § 29 (S.L.).
112. J. FENTON, supra note 84, at 26. The presumption is that if a person takes an
oath on another's "medicine" and commits perjury, such "medicine" will cause the
perjurer to suffer some grave misfortune. "Medicine" is a supernatural power that a
person has to protect himself from his enemies.
113. Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, Cap. 102, § 20(1), (3) (S.L.).
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There is no logical reason for the distinction in the existing law allow-
ing only the husband such a cause of action. The present law dis-
criminates against the wife in this respect. 114
L. SEPARATION
There is little information about separation under indigenous law.
Under indigenous law, the distinction between separation and divorce
is not clearly defined. The customs of most tribes permit the remarriage
of the wife if the dowry is repaid, and this may be regarded as the
factor which distinguishes divorce from separation.
The law with respect to separation should be the same for everyone.
It is recommended in relation to all marriages that: (1) the parties to a
marriage be at liberty to separate by agreement, making their own ar-
rangements as regards the disposal of property, maintenance, and the
custody of children, subject to a provision giving the court power to
vary or set aside any such arrangement where the circumstances have
changed in any material respect; (2) there be a single form of separation
by decree of the court.1 5
M. NULLITY
Under the existing statutory law, provision for nullity and divorce only
apply to monogamous marriage. Furthermore, the Matrimonial Causes
Ordinance does not clearly distinguish between void and voidable cere-
monies.
The Ordinance specifically states that:
In addition to any other grounds on which a marriage is by law void or
voidable, a marriage shall be voidable on the ground-
(a) that the marriage has not been consummated owing to the wilful refusal
of the respondent to consummate the marriage; or
(b) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage suffering from
venereal disease in a communicable form; or
(c) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some
person other than the petitioner,116
provided that in (b) and (c) above the court shall not grant a decree
unless it is satisfied that the petitioner was at the time of the marriage
ignorant of the facts alleged, instituted the proceedings within a year
of the date of the marriage, and that marital intercourse has not takeii
114. KENYA REPORT, supra note 85, at 64.
115. Id. at 84-85.
116. Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, Cap. 102, § 3(1) - (3) (S.L.).
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place since the petitioner discovered the existence of the grounds for a
decree.
Any child born pursuant to (b) above shall be deemed a legitimate
child of the parties notwithstanding the fact that the marriage is void.
Nothing in this section shall be construed as validating any marriage
which is by law void, but with respect to which a decree of nullity has
not been granted." 7
The following additional grounds for nullity are recommended: (1)
where either party was permanently impotent or incapable of consum-
mating the marriage at the time of the marriage and (2) where a party
has married without the consent of his or her guardian and the court is
satisfied that there is good reason for setting the marriage aside and the
proceedings are instituted while the party is below the age of 21 years." 8
N. DIVORCE
Christian and Civil marriages can only be dissolved by judicial decree
of a court which may be granted on the petition of either party." 9
Under indigenous law, a man can divorce his wife by declaring before
witnesses that he does not wish to keep her and by sending her back to
her family. If he does so, he has no claim to the return of the marriage
price. Mohammedans follow the same procedure, requiring two witnesses
to the declaration.
A native woman can divorce her husband by declaring before witnesses
that she is leaving him, by refusing to cohabit with him, or by deserting
him. Her family is then obligated to repay the marriage price or be
sued for such in court.
Repeated infidelity is not a ground for divorce by the wife against
her husband. On the other hand, it may be a good ground for the
husband against his wife.
In a Christian marriage, if no marriage price had been paid and the
wife afterwards is deserted, she cannot sue her husband for main-
tenance.12
0
A husband should no longer be able to divorce his wife by declaring
before witnesses that he does not wish to keep her and sending her back
to her family.
117. Id.
118. KENYA REPORT, supra note 85, at 87-91.
119. Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, Cap. 102, § 3-5 (S.L.).
120. J. FENTON, supra note 84, at 26-27.
Cornell International Law Journal/Vol. 5, No. 1
A legal divorce should be by order of the court. A marriage between
natives could be terminated by a native court.
It is recommended that the grounds for divorce be the same for hus-
band and wife. This is consistent with the modern trend towards provid-
ing greater social, economic, and legal equality between the sexes.
It is recommended that there be no divorce except by the decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is recommended that
cruelty (mental and physical) and incurable mental illness, certified by a
psychiatrist and at least one other physician, constitute additional
grounds for divorce. In addition, every petition for divorce should be re-
quired to contain: (1) a statement of the principal allegations sought to
be proved, (2) the terms of any agreement regarding maintenance, or,
where no agreement has been reached, the petitioner's proposals and
(3) the terms of any agreement regarding the custody and access to the
infant children, if any, of the marriage, or where no agreement has been
reached, the petitioner's proposals.
At present there is no registration or recording of divorces under
indigenous law. It is recommended that all divorces be required to be
registered and that there be a single system of registration applying
to all persons, regardless of race, religion, or community.121
0. MAINTENANCE
When a woman leaves or is driven out by her husband and goes to a
new husband, the latter usually pays the bride-price to the former,
otherwise circumstances determine whether the parents repay the first
husband or not. The first husband seems to have no claim when he has
turned his wife out of the house; but his wife must leave behind what
she earned in the husband's home. When the wife takes the initiative,
the husband seems to have a right to the money, but is sometimes too
proud to stand upon his rights, and will sometimes abandon them if the
woman has been a hard worker. As to the woman's property, there seems
to be a good deal of uncertainty; some informants hold that a runaway
can take what her parents give her and her husband's presents; others
that she can claim what she has earned (probably by trading in her hus-
band's house); others that her husband's ill-treatment gives her a right
to her property if she has been a hard worker, provided that she has no
children; others again that she will get nothing if she has no child but
may get something as an act of grace if she has a child, provided she had
not given her husband reason to send her away.122
121. KENYA REPORT, supra note 85, at 91-103.
122. Id. at 93-94.
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Where there is a monogamous marriage, a deserting husband may be
ordered to pay maintenance to his wife under the Married Women's
Maintenance Ordinance.123
Where a decree for restitution of conjugal rights is passed under the
Matrimonial Causes Ordinance and is not complied with, the Court may
order the husband to make "such periodical payments as may be just to
the wife."' 24
It is recommended that the Court have the power to order a man to
pay maintenance to his wife or former wife: (1) if he has deserted her;
or (2) during any matrimonial proceedings; or (3) on or following the
grant of a decree of separation; or (4) on or following the grant of a
decree of divorce.
Furthermore, the Court should be given the power to order a woman
to pay maintenance to her husband or former husband where she has the
means to do so and where he lacks means and is incapacitated by mental
or physical ill-health.
The amount of any maintenance awarded should be based on the
means and needs of the parties. The Court should also take into account
the degree of responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage. The
present Married Women's Maintenance Ordinance provides for a maxi-
mum weekly maintenance of four pounds. 2 5
It is recommended that the amount of maintenance be left entirely
in the discretion of the Court, without any guiding formula. The
statutory maximum of four pounds should be eliminated.
A Court should also be given the discretionary power to order that
any assets acquired during the marriage by the joint efforts of the
husband and wife be divided between them on divorce. The Court
should take into consideration the customs of the community to which the
parties belong, the contributions each made to acquiring the assets, the
liabilities contracted by either in such joint interest, and the needs of the
children of the marriage and, subject to the foregoing, should lean to-
wards equality. Finally, the right to maintenance of a divorced person
should automatically cease if he or she remarries, except where the
parties have agreed otherwise. 26
Except where there has been separation by agreement or court order,
a wife should be under a legal duty to obtain relief from the court in
the form of a court order for maintenance if her husband unreasonably
123. Married Woman's Maintainence Ordinance, Cap. 100, § 2 (S.L.).
124. Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, Cap. 102, § 18 (S.L.).
125. Married Woman's Maintenence Ordinance, Cap. 100, § 2 (S.L.).
126. KENYA RFPORT, supra note 85, at 106-113.
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refuses or neglects to provide for her. This is the present law in regard
to monogamous marriages. Also, under Moslem law, a wife generally
has a right to maintenance. Under most indigenous laws a wife has the
right to be maintained by her husband only as long as she lives with him.
The standard of maintenance should depend on the husband's means
and style of life.
It is recommended that the law expressly state that except where there
has been separation by agreement or by order of a court, a husband has
a legal duty to maintain his wife or wives according to his means and
station in life. Furthermore, where a husband unreasonably refuses or
neglects to provide for his wife, the Court should have power, on her
application, to grant her an order for maintenance.
P. CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
In any proceeding for divorce or nullity of marriage or judicial sep-
aration, the Court may from time to time, either before or by or after
the final decree, make such provision as appears just with respect to
the custody, maintenance, and education of the children, the marriage
of whose parents is the subject of the proceedings, or, if it thinks fit,
direct proper proceedings to be taken for placing the children under the
protection of the Court.127
The Court, in its discretion, on any decree of divorce or nullity of
marriage, may order the husband to secure for the benefit of the chil-
dren such gross or annual sum of money as it deems reasonable. For that
purpose the Court may order a proper deed or instrument to be executed
by all necessary parties. Such arrangement ceases when the child reaches
21 years of age.128
The father is generally entitled to custody of the children under
indigenous law. It does not seem that anyone should have an absolute
right to the custody of infant children of a marriage if the parents
separate or divorce.
Under indigenous law, if one parent is dead, the children of a marriage
remain with the other parent. If the wife is the survivor, she will be re-
quired to live with the deceased's family or to leave the children there.
If both parents are dead, the children remain with the father's family. If
the mother has been divorced or has separated from her husband, the
children remain with the father.
127. Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, Cap. 102, § 24 (1) (S.L.).
128. Id. § 24 (3).
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It has been held under Lemne and Kono law that where the wife
has gone to live with another man that children born of this second
union still belong to the first husband until the marriage money has
been repaid. The law should be that children of the second union belong
to the wife and second husband.
A surviving wife should no longer be required by law to live with
the deceased's family or to leave the children there. Neither should the
law favor the father's family over the mother's family where both parents
are dead. Nor if the mother is divorced or separated from her husband
should the law automatically entitle the father to their custody. The
guiding principle regarding child custody should be the best interest
of the children.
Children too young (under seven) to leave the mother when the mar-
riage is dissolved remain with her until they are old enough to go with
the father, at which time they go to him if he claims them. He should
be able to show that he has supported them while they were with the
mother; or she should offer to pay the reasonable cost of the upbringing
to the date when the claim is made. 129
The fittest person should have custody of the children, whether it be
the mother or the father.
Under the law children should belong to both parents and there
should be no preference in awarding custody based on sex.
It is recommended that, following a separation or divorce decree, the
custody of the infant children of the marriage should be decided by the
Court, with the paramount consideration being the good of the children.
The Court should consider the wishes of the parents and children and
local custom. It should also take into consideration the advice of any
available officers trained in child welfare. Furthermore, there should
be a presumption that children below the age of seven years should
be in the custody of their mothers. However, such presumption should
be rebuttable on the facts of any particular case.
The Court should be given the power at any time to vary or set aside:
(1) any order relating to the custody of the children whose parents are
separated or divorced; and
(2) any agreement relating to the custody of children made between the
parents on or following their voluntary separation.
It is also recommended that the Court be given power, when making
an order for the custody of a child or at any later time, to order that
any parent denied custody or any members of such parent's family be
allowed access to the child at such times and with such frequency as
seems reasonable to the Court.
129. J. FENToN, supra note 84, at 29-30.
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In addition, the Court should have the power in all separation or
divorce cases to order the father to pay the cost of maintenance of his
children. This should be irrespective of any order that may be made as
to their custody. The Court should also have the discretionary power
to order the mother to pay or contribute towards the maintenance of her
children if she has the means to do so. Custody orders should relate only
to children under 18 years of age.
The Court should be given power on the application of any interested
party to issue an order prohibiting the taking of a child outside the
jurisdiction.130
V. CONCLUSION
The present dual judicial system and pluralistic legal systems of many
Black African countries are impediments to their progress. Integrated
judicial and legal systems must quickly evolve if they are to take their
rightful places in the family of nations as strong united nations free from
racial, religious, or tribal interests. In the writer's opinion such changes
are imperative if meaningful political, economic, and social progress
is to be made.
Legislation is probably the best way to bring about change of the
magnitude required. It is hoped that the recommendations and sug-
gestions for change outlined in this paper can at least serve as a guide-
line or point of departure for constructive change in Sierra Leone and
other Black African nations. It is perhaps unnecessary to state that any
contemplated changes in the law should fully take into consideration
political, economic, and social institutions existing in the respective
countries.
130. KENYA REPORT, supra note 85, at 114-119.
